
Stephen G. Keim
ShareholderatMarshall Dennehey
Philadelphia, PA
Practicing general in Philadelphia since 2009.
- 17+
- Years practicing
- 5.0 ★
- 1 client review
- 5
- Bar admissions
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Quick answer
Stephen G. Keim is a shareholder based in Philadelphia, PA. The practice focuses on General, Litigation, and Product Liability. Stephen has over 17 years of legal experience. Currently practicing at Marshall Dennehey. Rated 5.0 out of 5 from 1 client review.
- Based in
- Philadelphia, PA
- Experience
- over 17 years
- Known for
- General · Litigation · Product Liability
- Handles General, Litigation, and Product Liability matters from Philadelphia, PA.
- Over 17 years of practice as a licensed attorney.
- Recognized with Peer Reviewed.
About Stephen G. Keim: Stephen G. Keim is a shareholder based in Philadelphia, PA. The practice focuses on General, Litigation, and Product Liability. Stephen has over 17 years of legal experience. Currently practicing at Marshall Dennehey. Rated 5.0 out of 5 from 1 client review.
Areas of practice
Practice focus
Stephen G. Keim represents clients in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania across the following areas of law. Each area links to other verified attorneys with the same focus.
Biography
About Stephen G. Keim
Stephen is a shareholder in the firm’s Casualty Department. He represents clients in motor vehicle accidents, premises liability, products liability, business litigation and professional liability matters. He has significant experience defending attorneys, real estate brokers and agents, accountants and architects against professional liability claims. He also defends financial institutions, debt servicers and buyers, auto finance companies, collection attorneys, student lenders, telecommunication providers, mortgage lenders and credit reporting agencies against claims brought pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act and state consumer laws in both state and federal court.
Stephen graduated from the William S. Boyd School of Law. Following graduation, he clerked for Judge Abbi Silver, now Nevada Supreme Court Justice, in the Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada. After completing his clerkship, Stephen joined an insurance defense firm where he focused his practice on legal malpractice, real estate/broker and director and officer cases. He is admitted to practice in all state courts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey as well as the United States District Courts for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the District of New Jersey.
Thought Leadership
Defense Digest
Plaintiff’s Failure to Identify Factual Causation Among Multiple Possible Defects Warrants Summary Judgment
December 1, 2025
Key Points:The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reaffirms a plaintiff’s burden to prove causation. Where the plaintiff is unable to identify factual causation, or provides multiple theories of causation, a dispositive motion should be considered. A jury is not permitted to reach a verdict based on speculation or conjecture as to causation. Where a plaintiff cannot establish the factual cause of an injury, summary judgment may be appropriate. For example, in Mohar v. Shawver et al., 317 A.3d 607 (Pa. Super. 2024), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reaffirmed a plaintiff’s burden to establish a prima facie negligence claim; specifically, the causal connection between the alleged injuries and the alleged negligence. The court affirmed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to identify the specific defect that caused her to fall. The plaintiff alleged she slipped and fell while attending a house showing. While touring the property, the plaintiff walked up a ramp to a shed in the backyard; she slipped and fell as she turned. She filed a lawsuit, sounding in negligence, against several defendants, including the property owners and real estate professionals. Notably, during discovery, the plaintiff could not identify what caused her to fall. She testified: “It happened so fast. I was standing and then I wasn’t. I can’t answer that.” Furthermore, she was unable to describe the defective or slippery condition, attributing it to multiple defects, including wet leaves, moss, or the wet wood. Notably, the plaintiff could not rule out the possibility that she may have just lost her balance. At the conclusion of discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment based on the plaintiff’s failure to establish a connection between her alleged injuries and the alleged negligence. While the plaintiff identified multiple potential defects, she failed to identify which, if any, of the alleged defects actually caused her to slip.In granting summary judgment, the trial court relied upon Houston v. Republican Athletic Ass’n, 22 A.2d 715, 716 (Pa. 1941), where the court held that the plaintiff failed to establish the element of causation sufficient to submit the case to a jury as there were multiple theories attributing an accident to a variety of causes for which the defendants could not be held liable. The court also relied on Freund v. Hyman, 103 A.2d 658 (Pa. 1954), where the Supreme Court granted compulsory nonsuit as the testimony did not identify the cause of the fall, and Erb v. Council Rock Sch. Distr., 2009 WL 9097261 (Pa. Cmwlth. Mar. 26, 2009), where the court granted summary judgment after determining that the plaintiff did not produce any evidence that a defective condition was the proximate cause of her fall and injury. In affirming the trial court’s order granting summary judgment, the Superior Court explained, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the evidence of causation was completely circumstantial and there was no evidence that any of the alleged potential defects actually caused the plaintiff to fall. Furthermore, there was an equal possibility that the plaintiff’s alleged injuries resulted from a trip or stumble without such tripping or stumbling having any connection with the alleged defect. Even though the plaintiff could testify as to where she slid, she failed to make the connection between slipping and the alleged negligence. A jury is not permitted to reach a verdict based on speculation or conjecture as to causation. The Mohar decision reiterates and underscores the importance of holding a plaintiff to their burden of establishing proximate causation as a prima facie element of a negligence claim. If a plaintiff is unable to identify the cause of an accident, provides vague discovery responses or multiple theories of causation, defense counsel should consider filing a dispositive motion. Finally, the Mohar decision has been cited in recent orders granting summary judgment, including Regina v. Summit Pointe Property Owners Ass’n, Monroe County Court of Common Pleas Case No. 1172-CV-2020 and Orwig v. Shinn, 323 A.3d 216 (Pa. Super. 2024). Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.
News
Marshall Dennehey Announces 2024 Shareholder Class And Special Counsel Promotions
December 19, 2023
Credentials
Education
William S. Boyd School of Law, Las Vegas, NV J.D. cum laude William S. Boyd School of Law, Las Vegas, NV J.D. 2009 CALI Award for Highest Grade in Professional Responsibility
—
Kutztown University of Pennsylvania, Kutztown, PA
B.S. Psychology · 2002
Jurisdictions
Bar admissions
New Jersey
2018 · ACTIVE
U.S. District Court
2018 · ACTIVE
U.S. District Court
2016 · ACTIVE
Pennsylvania
2010 · ACTIVE
Nevada
2009 · ACTIVE
Recognition
Awards & honors
Peer Reviewed
Affiliations
Professional memberships
Associations & Memberships •NCBA
The National Creditors Bar Association · membership
Locations
Office locations
Client feedback
What clients say about Stephen G. Keim
5.0
1 client review
Client ratings are sourced from public records and editorial research. Reviews on LawyersListed are accepted from verified clients once Stephen G. Keim claims this profile.
Read all reviewsFrequently asked
Common questions
What areas of law does Stephen G. Keim practice?
Stephen G. Keim focuses on General, Litigation, Product Liability, Business, and Consumer.
Where is Stephen G. Keim located?
Stephen G. Keim primarily serves clients in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, with an office at 2000 Market Street, Suite 2300.
How experienced is Stephen G. Keim?
Stephen G. Keim has 17 years of legal practice, having been licensed since 2009.
Is Stephen G. Keim a verified attorney?
Stephen G. Keim's profile is listed but has not yet been claimed by the attorney. Verification status is pending.
How can I schedule a consultation with Stephen G. Keim?
You can book a consultation through LawyersListed directly from this page. Initial outreach can also be made by phone at 484-895-2317.
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